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Bias in Adolescents: Effects of Valence and Perspective
S. Burnett Heyes1,2 • A. Pictet3 • H. Mitchell4 • S. M. Raeder2,5 • J. Y. F. Lau2,6 •
E. A. Holmes4,7 • S. E. Blackwell4,8
 The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Mental imagery has a powerful impact on
emotion and cognitive processing in adults, and is impli-
cated in emotional disorders. Research suggests the per-
spective adopted in mental imagery modulates its
emotional impact. However, little is known about the
impact of mental imagery in adolescence, despite adoles-
cence being the key time for the onset of emotional dys-
function. We administered computerised positive versus
mixed valence picture-word mental imagery training to
male adolescent participants (N = 60, aged 11–16 years)
across separate field and observer perspective sessions.
Positive mood increased more following positive than
mixed imagery; pleasantness ratings of ambiguous pictures
increased following positive versus mixed imagery gener-
ated from field but not observer perspective; negative
interpretation bias on a novel scrambled sentences task was
smaller following positive than mixed imagery particularly
when imagery was generated from field perspective. These
findings suggest positive mental imagery generation alters
mood and cognition in male adolescents, with the latter
moderated by imagery perspective. Identifying key com-
ponents of such training, such as imagery perspective,
extends understanding of the relationship between mental
imagery, mood, and cognition in adolescence.
Keywords Mental imagery  Field perspective  Observer
perspective  Adolescence  Cognitive bias modification 
Scrambled sentences task  Psychopathology  Cognitive
training  Emotion
Introduction
Adolescence is a major period of life for the onset of
mental health problems (Kessler et al. 1994, 2012a, b;
Ormel et al. 2014; Paus et al. 2008). Understanding the
mechanisms underlying emotional dysfunction and devel-
oping appropriate treatments is a priority. In adults,
research has highlighted mental imagery as a key feature
and contributor to emotional dysfunction across a range of
psychological disorders (Holmes and Mathews 2010).
Little is known about this relationship in adolescents. In
adolescence, continuing maturation of basic cognitive
processes (Luna et al. 2004; Dumontheil et al. 2010; Weil
et al. 2013) and emotion regulation capabilities (Silvers
et al. 2012), in combination with changes in motivational
and social concerns (Crone and Dahl 2012; Geier and Luna
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2009; Steinberg 2008), may render individuals more vul-
nerable to emotional (including imagery) symptoms.
Conversely, these same developmental features suggest
adolescents may benefit from appropriately targeted inter-
ventions (Burnett Heyes et al. 2013). In the current study,
we investigated the impact of generating emotional mental
imagery on mood and cognition in adolescents.
Mental imagery, defined as the experience of perception
in the absence of matching sensory input (Kosslyn et al.
2006), is hypothesised to contribute to emotional dys-
function across a range of psychological disorders (Holmes
and Mathews 2010). Correlational evidence shows indi-
viduals with depression experience an excess of intrusive
negative imagery, and difficulties in generating positive
mental imagery (Weßlau and Steil 2014; Holmes et al.
2016a, b). In social phobia, intrusive, negative third-person
perspective mental imagery during social interactions (e.g.
of self blushing bright red) causes distress and negatively
impacts social performance (Hirsch et al. 2003). These
observations suggest an association between mental ima-
gery and emotional and cognitive processes in emotional
disorders.
Experimental evidence lends weight to the notion that
mental imagery has a causal, not just correlational, rela-
tionship with emotion. Studies with non-clinical, dyspho-
ric, depressed and socially-anxious adult samples show that
deliberately generating mental imagery in response to
emotionally valenced cues (e.g. verbal stories or picture-
word pairs) gives rise to congruent changes in positive,
depressed or anxious mood (Holmes et al. 2006, 2008b;
Pictet et al. 2011; Stopa et al. 2012). In contrast, verbal
processing of the same training stimuli does not give rise to
comparable changes in mood (Holmes and Mathews 2005;
Holmes et al. 2008b), and may even lead to mood wors-
ening (Holmes et al. 2006, 2008a, 2009).
Generating mental imagery can also induce changes in
cognitive processing, for example, in the interpretation of
ambiguous information. Information processing accounts
of emotional disorders highlight cognitive factors including
interpretation bias that cause or maintain symptoms
(Mathews and MacLeod 2002). Anxious and depressed
participants tend to interpret emotionally ambiguous
information in a negative manner (Mathews and MacLeod
2005; Muris and Field 2008; Wisco and Nolen-Hoeksema
2010; Orchard et al. 2015), with negative interpretation
bias predicting associated symptomatology in adults
(Kleim et al. 2014; Woud et al. 2014). Generating mental
imagery of a particular emotional valence causes congruent
changes in interpretation bias in non-clinical and dysphoric
adults (Holmes et al. 2009; Pictet et al. 2011). Bias change
can take place following a single session of mental imagery
(Holmes et al. 2009) and persist 24 h later (Pictet et al.
2011).
In adolescent samples, changes in interpretation bias
have been induced by cognitive training procedures (often
termed Cognitive Bias Modification for interpretation, or
CBM-I) incorporating a mental imagery element (Lau et al.
2011, 2012, Lothmann et al. 2011). Adolescent participants
trained to interpret verbal material in a positively-valenced
manner selected more positive interpretations than negative
interpretations, whereas those trained to interpret material
in a negatively-valenced manner showed effects in the
opposite direction. In a subset of the above studies, par-
ticipants in the positive CBM-I condition additionally
showed a decrease in self-reported impact of recent
stressful life events and responses to a laboratory stressor.
Extending CBM-I with imagery to a sample of anxious
adolescent patients, similar changes in interpretational
style were found (Fu et al. 2013). Thus, these training
procedures developed in adults have shown some efficacy
in boosting positive interpretations in child and adolescent
samples. However, the underlying mechanisms are not
fully understood.
What are the components of mental imagery that give
rise to its impact on mood and cognition? One candidate is
mental imagery perspective. Mental imagery can be gen-
erated from a field (first person) perspective or from an
observer (third person) perspective. There is evidence for
individual differences in preferred imagery perspective
(Robinson and Swanson 1993; Vella and Moulds 2014).
Adults and adolescents with depression show greater use of
the observer perspective, particularly for positive memories
and events, and adults with social anxiety report intrusive
negative observer perspective imagery of social interac-
tions (Bergouignan et al. 2008; Kuyken and Howell 2006;
Lemogne et al. 2006; Williams and Moulds 2007; see also
Nelis et al. 2013). Observer perspective imagery is asso-
ciated with reduced sensory and emotional reliving and
reduced self-relevance (Berntsen and Rubin 2006; Nigro
and Neisser 1983). Non-clinical adult participants instruc-
ted to generate field perspective imagery in response to
positive cues showed greater changes in mood than did
participants in an observer perspective condition (Holmes
et al. 2008a), although Nelis et al. (2012) did not replicate
this effect, suggesting the need for further investigation.
Taking an observer perspective is hypothesised to dampen
mood, whereas taking a field perspective is hypothesised to
facilitate emotional processing (Berntsen and Rubin 2006;
Holmes et al. 2008a; McIsaac and Eich 2002; Nigro and
Neisser 1983). As such, explicit instruction to adopt a field
perspective is hypothesised to enhance emotional impact in
adults and adolescents alike. Furthermore, evidence from
the cognitive developmental literature indicates that the
ability to deliberately take other perspectives (cognitive
perspective-taking ability) is still developing during ado-
lescence (Dumontheil et al. 2010). Also showing extended
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development during adolescence are other cognitive abili-
ties that would support deliberate, sustained adoption of a
particular perspective (i.e. executive functions such as
working memory; Luna et al. 2004), and awareness of the
extent to which a particular perspective was being adhered
to (i.e. metacognitive accuracy; Weil et al. 2013). Toge-
ther, these lines of converging evidence suggest adoles-
cents will need more guidance than adults to achieve the
same level of success in adopting a particular perspective.
That is, for adolescent participants, explicit guidance on
how to adopt a field versus observer perspective may
enhance the impact of field perspective imagery training on
mood and cognition. This was evaluated in the current
study.
This study used a mental imagery generation procedure
in which participants were instructed to repeatedly generate
positive or mixed valence field or observer perspective
mental imagery in response to a set of training stimuli
(Blackwell et al. 2015; Holmes et al. 2008b; Pictet et al.
2011). Stimuli were ambiguous pictures paired with dis-
ambiguating verbal captions (Pictet et al. 2011; Holmes
et al. 2008a, b). For example, a participant presented with a
picture of a rain cloud in combination with the word ‘‘re-
freshing’’ may imagine the pleasant feeling of cool rain on
a hot day. The same picture paired with the phrase ‘‘cold
and wet’’ may lead to the participant to generate more
negatively valenced imagery. Participants viewed picture-
word pairs suggesting either consistently positive resolu-
tions (positive imagery group), or a mixture of positive and
negative resolutions (mixed imagery group). Within each
valence group, each participant underwent field and
observer perspective imagery training on separate days
(field and observer perspective conditions).
The picture-word mental imagery generation procedure,
adapted from previous studies (Pictet et al. 2011; Holmes
et al. 2008a, b), was optimised for adolescents. In adoles-
cence, peer relationships assume heightened importance for
social and personal development (Bagwell and Schmidt
2013; Lorme et al. 2013; Nelson et al. 2005), and social
goals such as reputation and friendship can be an important
motivating factor, as well as a source of distress (Davey
et al. 2008; Gullone and King 1993). Therefore, in order to
target key sources of concern in adolescent participants, we
increased the proportion of picture-word stimuli suggesting
social situations involving peers (see Table 1). For exam-
ple, a participant presented with a picture of a smartphone
in combination with the phrase ‘‘funny text’’ [i.e. SMS]
may imagine a joke shared with a friend, whereas the same
picture paired with ‘‘ignoring me’’ may prompt negative
imagery. Second, to maximise task engagement, the num-
ber of picture-word cues was reduced in number, while on
each trial, longer time was allowed to generate mental
imagery—in view of evidence showing development
during adolescence in imagery generation speed (Kosslyn
et al. 1990). In view of the experimental nature of the
adolescent imagery training manipulation, we recruited
non-clinical participants. Given the novelty of this topic,
we restricted our sample to a single gender to reduce
within-sample variance and enable optimisation of imagery
training stimuli content. Participants were all male due to
an opportunity sample from a boys’ school. Participants
rated positive and negative mood before and after imagery
generation and completed three measures of cognitive
(interpretation) bias.
Measures of interpretation bias were as follows. First,
participants rated pleasantness of a set of ambiguous pho-
tograph stimuli before and after imagery generation. This
measure has shown training effects in previous imagery
generation studies in adults (Holmes et al. 2008, b; Pictet
et al. 2011). Second, participants completed a novel
scrambled sentences task (SST) adapted from previous
versions (Standage et al. 2010; Watson and Friend 1969;
Wenzlaff and Bates 1998), after imagery generation. An
SST has been used as an outcome measure of interpretive
bias in both experimental (Holmes et al. 2009) and clinical
(e.g. Blackwell et al. 2015) studies with adult participants.
We constructed an SST version that was suitable for ado-
lescent participants and that can be administered twice,
following separate field and observer perspective imagery
sessions. Finally, participants completed a computerised
recognition task (CRT), which has been widely used in
adolescent CBM-I studies (e.g. Lothmann et al. 2011; Lau
et al. 2012; Fu et al. 2013), after imagery generation. The
CRT was adapted to create two separate versions, for
administration following separate field and observer per-
spective sessions.
We predicted greater increases in positive mood and
fewer negative interpretations following positive than
mixed imagery training. Negative interpretations were
operationalized as relatively low pleasantness ratings of
ambiguous photographs, negative bias score on the SST,
and endorsing negative interpretations on the CRT. Fur-
ther, we predicted that the impact of positive imagery
generation would be greater following field than observer
perspective imagery.
Method
Participants
60 individuals (male; mean age = 13.8, SD = 1.0; age
range 11.9–16.3 years) were recruited via letters sent home
from school (N = 45; of which N = 40 private school and
N = 5 state school) or advertisements in the local com-
munity (N = 15). An information sheet given to parents
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specified that individuals with ‘‘a history of mood or anx-
iety problems’’ were not eligible to take part. The study
was approved by the University of Oxford Central
University Research Ethics Committee and was carried out
in accordance with the provisions of the World Medical
Association Declaration of Helsinki. The current sample
size of 60 was determined based on Pictet et al. (2011)
which used a picture-word imagery generation task with
approximately N = 30 per valence group.
Design
Participants were randomly assigned to receive two ses-
sions of either positive or mixed imagery training. Each
participant completed both field and observer perspective
imagery sessions on separate days, with perspective order
counterbalanced within valence groups.
Overview of the Procedure
In each session, participants first completed baseline
measures of mood and one measure of interpretation bias,
followed by mental imagery instructions and the picture-
word imagery generation task. After training, participants
repeated mood and interpretation bias measures and com-
pleted two further measures of interpretation bias. See
Figure S1 (Supplementary Material) for a timeline of the
experimental sessions.
Materials
Positive and Negative Affective State
Positive and negative affective state was assessed using
emotion words from the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS-X; Watson and Clark 1994). Each
emotion word was rated on a 5-point scale (‘‘not at all’’ to
‘‘extremely’’), using the state instructions (‘‘Indicate to
what extent you feel this way right now’’). To create a brief
measure that was engaging for participants and could be
administered repeatedly on a laptop, 21 emotion words
were selected, in total fourteen negative (seven fear, seven
sad) and nine positive items. An E-prime programme
randomly selected six negative (three sad, three fear) and
four positive words (i.e. ten words in total). Ten words per
PANAS administration was selected as a satisfactory
compromise between brevity (maximising task engage-
ment) and variance (maximising operating range/power).
An equal number of sad and fear words was selected since
positive imagery training effects have been reported on
both anxious mood (Holmes et al. 2008a, b) and depressive
symptoms (Lang et al. 2012) in adults. For analyses of
PANAS data, dependent variables were t1–t2 standardised
residuals representing change in mean positive and mean
negative mood ratings from t1 to t2 correcting for any
differences at t1 (Jacob et al. 2013).
Pleasantness Ratings of Picture Stimuli
Pleasantness ratings were given in response to 40 picture
stimuli as a measure of interpretation bias. The set con-
sisted of 20 ‘‘novel’’ and 20 ‘‘familiar’’ pictures. ‘‘Novel’’
stimuli were selected at random each time the task was
administered from a set of 40 pictures selected from pre-
vious studies that did not appear in the imagery generation
task. ‘‘Familiar’’ stimuli were chosen at random each time
the task was administered from the set of 75 pictures used
in the picture-word imagery generation task. This factor
was included to investigate generalisation of training
effects. An E-prime task programme selected the pictures
Table 1 Examples of picture-word stimuli used in the imagery training task
Picture Accompanying caption in positive valence imagery
condition
Accompanying negative caption in mixed valence imagery
condition
Smartphone ‘‘Funny text’’ [i.e. SMS] ‘‘Ignoring me’’
Facebook
screenshot
‘‘Friend request’’ ‘‘Unfriended’’
Football game ‘‘Great shot’’ ‘‘Own goal’’
Classroom ‘‘Good test result’’ ‘‘Exam stress’’
Alarm clock ‘‘Lie in’’ ‘‘Late again’’
School bag ‘‘Found it’’ ‘‘Can’t find it’’
School play ‘‘Great performance’’ ‘‘Forgot my lines’’
Board game ‘‘Winner’’ ‘‘Cheat’’
Girls laughing ‘‘Friends’’ ‘‘Laugh at me’’
Snowball fight ‘‘Lively game’’ ‘‘Not fair’’
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and presented them in a random order without words
against a black background for 1500 ms. Participants rated
the subjective emotional valence of each picture from
1(‘‘extremely unpleasant’’) to 9 (‘‘extremely pleasant’’).
For analyses of pleasantness data, the dependent variable
was t1–t2 standardised residuals representing change in
mean ratings from t1 to t2 correcting for any differences at
t1 (Jacob et al. 2013). In addition, to investigate generali-
sation of training effects, a stimulus Novelty factor (two
levels: Familiar, Novel) was included.
Mental Imagery Instructions
A standardised mental imagery instruction script was
adapted from Pictet et al. (2011). First, mental imagery was
defined as the experience of ‘‘seeing with the mind’s eye,
hearing with the mind’s ear, and so on’’, using Kosslyn
et al. (2006) definition, i.e., in any sensory modality. Par-
ticipants were prompted to give their own definition of
mental imagery, to check comprehension. The experi-
menter next gave either field or observer perspective
instructions according to condition assignment (field:
‘‘Right now, we’re interested in mental imagery that you
imagine seeing through your own eyes, happening to you,
as if you are actively involved’’; observer: ‘‘Right now,
we’re interested in mental imagery that you imagine from a
detached point of view, as if you’re observing yourself in a
situation—seeing yourself from above, or from the outside,
from behind or in front, or as if you’re watching yourself
on TV’’), which participants were prompted to briefly
practice by imagining they were in their bedroom (field), or
imagining they could see themselves in the testing room
(observer). All participants were then given a standardised
imagery generation practice task of imagining seeing,
holding and cutting a lemon (field), or imagining they
could see themselves doing so (observer). Within this
practice task, participants were familiarised with paper
versions of vividness and perspective rating scales (for
further details, see next section). Finally, participants were
given practice in generating field or observer perspective
mental imagery in response to two (both positive, or one
positive and one negative) picture-word cues presented on
paper.
Picture-Word Cues to Generate Mental Images
Participants generated field or observer perspective mental
imagery in response to 79 picture-word cues on a laptop (4
practice and 75 training). The stimuli comprised pictures
selected from previous studies (Pictet et al. 2011), created
for the study by the authors, or downloaded from the
internet.
Each picture was paired with a word or short phrase
intended, when paired with the relevant picture, to create a
positive emotional resolution (e.g. a picture of a hand
holding a mobile phone and the phrase ‘‘funny text’’ [i.e.
SMS]) or a negative emotional resolution (e.g. the same
picture paired with the phrase ‘‘ignoring me’’; see Table 1).
In the positive condition, all pictures were paired with
captions that suggested a positive resolution. In the mixed
condition, the computer program randomly paired half of
the pictures with captions that suggested a negative reso-
lution and half with captions that suggested a positive
resolution. All participants saw the same pictures, but the
proportion with positive/negative valence differed accord-
ing to condition assignment. Approximately 50 % of the
stimuli suggested a social situation.
Picture-word cue stimuli were presented using E-Prime
(Schneider et al. 2002) on a laptop. Instructions on the
screen for 1000 ms stated ‘‘imagine the combination of the
next picture and word as if you were actively involved
[field]/from a detached perspective [observer]’’. Four
practice and 75 training trials were presented in ran-
domised order, the latter in blocks of 5.
For each picture-word cue participants were instructed
to shut their eyes and generate a mental image that com-
bined the picture with the word. Captions were displayed in
white against a black background, centrally beneath the
relevant picture for 4500 ms, followed by a 1000 ms beep.
At or after the beep, participants opened their eyes and
rated imagery vividness on a scale from 1 (‘‘not at all
vivid’’) to 5 (‘‘extremely vivid’’). After every practice trial,
and after every five training trials, participants were also
prompted to rate the extent to which the perspective of
their mental image corresponded to field or observer
instructions, on a scale from 1 (‘‘not at all involved/de-
tached’’) to 5 (‘‘extremely involved/detached’’), and to talk
to the experimenter, to check task compliance. Here, the
experimenter prompted participants to describe (if they
could) an image from the most recent block, and gave
positive verbal feedback for descriptions which (a) made
use of both the picture and caption, (b) were consistent
with field or observer perspective imagery (McIsaac and
Eich 2002) and (c) described imagery content suggestive of
sensory image-based (rather than language-based) pro-
cessing (Holmes and Mathews 2010).
Filler Task to Equalize Mood
Participants listened to six 40 s classical music extracts
(Holmes et al. 2008b, 2009; Pictet et al. 2011). The filler
task is administered to return mood to baseline levels fol-
lowing imagery generation, prior to completing measures
of interpretation bias. Thus, any differences in interpreta-
tion bias scores would not be attributable to affective
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carryover from mental imagery (i.e., mood priming). To
promote task compliance, participants rated how pleasant
they found each musical extract on a scale of 1 (‘‘extremely
unpleasant’’) to 9 (‘‘extremely pleasant’’).
Scrambled Sentences Task
A novel scrambled sentences task (SST) was administered
to measure interpretation bias (see Table S1, Supplemen-
tary Material). Participants unscrambled a list of 20
scrambled sentences, using five out of the six displayed
words, within a time limit of 4 min. This was completed
under cognitive load (holding in mind a 4-digit number).
Each sentence (e.g. ‘‘will people my mistakes notice tal-
ents’’) could be unscrambled to form a positive resolution
(‘‘people will notice my talents’’) or a negative resolution
(‘‘people will notice my mistakes’’). A negativity score was
generated by calculating the proportion of sentences com-
pleted correctly with negative valence; this was used for
descriptive and inferential statistics. Two versions of the
SST, each containing different stimuli, were used in the
current study (i.e. for field and observer perspective ima-
gery sessions), with SST version order counterbalanced
across valence and perspective conditions. The SST pro-
vides a pen-and-paper measure of interpretation bias.
Construction and Validation of the Novel Scrambled Sen-
tences Task We adapted the task from adult SST versions
(Standage et al. 2010; Watson and Friend 1969; Wenzlaff
and Bates 1998) resulting in an adolescent-appropriate
SST. In view of the imagery training procedure’s emphasis
on social situations involving peers, our novel SST com-
prised statements reflecting general and social anxiety-re-
lated concerns. Stimuli were constructed using statements
from the Kiddie Schedule for Affective Disorders Present
and Lifetime Diagnostic interview (K-SADS-PL; Kaufman
et al. 1997), the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale, and
items from the adult social anxiety SST (Standage et al.
2010). All scrambled sentence stimuli were written in the
first person. Forty scrambled sentence stimuli were devel-
oped (see Table S1, Supplementary Material) resulting in
two versions of the SST. A random subset of 20 of these
stimuli was validated in a pilot sample of N = 60 young
adult controls [mean (SD) age = 20.1 (.92); 30 male]. In
this pilot sample, negativity scores on the novel SST were
correlated with scores on the Liebowitz Social Anxiety
Scale (r = .350, p = .004; Liebowitz 1987) and with
scores on the trait State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (r = .414,
p B .001; Spielberger 1989), suggesting sensitivity of our
novel SST to general and social anxiety-related negative
interpretation bias.
Computerised Recognition Test
A computerised recognition test (CRT) based on Mathews
and Mackintosh (2000) and adapted from Lothmann et al.
(2011) was administered in E-prime. The task comprises a
series of 10 (from a set of 20) ambiguous social scenarios
displayed in text on the screen. Participants read each
description and complete a neutral word fragment. For
example: ‘‘The park: You are walking through the park on
your way home from having your hair cut. As you walk
past some girls, you see that they are wh-sp-ring’’. After
participants had read all 10 scenarios they completed a
‘‘recognition test’’ to assess interpretation bias. The title of
the situation (‘‘The park’’) was presented at the top of the
screen along with four sequentially-presented recognition
statements. Two sentences comprised ‘‘targets’’ depicting a
positive (‘‘The girls start to whisper because they think you
look good with your new haircut’’) or a negative (‘‘The
girls start to whisper because they think your new haircut
looks terrible’’) interpretation. Two sentences comprised
‘‘foils’’, i.e., valenced statements that included information
not explicitly given in the ambiguous situations. Partici-
pants were instructed to rate the similarity of each recog-
nition statement to the material presented during the test
phase, on a scale from 1 (very different in meaning) to 4
(very similar in meaning). As in previous studies, foils
were included to investigate whether training effects
specifically altered interpretational style (that were con-
tained in targets) or whether training facilitated general
response bias to valenced material (i.e., the tendency to
give higher similarity ratings to positive or negative
information congruent with the training condition). Two
versions of the CRT were administered in the current study
(once per session—i.e. once following field perspective
imagery, and once following observer perspective ima-
gery), with version order counterbalanced across valence
and perspective conditions. Inferential statistics were con-
ducted investigating effects of the within-subjects factors
recognition statement valence (Positive, Negative) and
recognition statement type (Target, Foil) on similarity
ratings.
Questionnaire Measures
Social Anxiety Scale for Adolescents
The social anxiety scale for adolescents (SAS-A; La Greca
and Lopez 1998) is a brief self-report measure of social
anxiety. Eighteen social anxiety statements are rated on a
5-point scale (true for you ‘‘not at all’’ to ‘‘all of the time’’).
The scale consists of three interrelated subscales and shows
good internal consistency and test–retest reliability, with
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evidence for construct and concurrent validity (Inderb-
itzen-Nolan and Walters 2000; La Greca 1998; La Greca
and Lopez 1998).
Procedure
Written informed consent was obtained from a par-
ent/guardian of all participants. Participants recruited via
school were tested in a quiet room in school. Participants
recruited via the community were tested in a quiet room at
the University.
Participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to receive
either positive or mixed imagery training (N = 30 per
group). For each testing site, we created a randomisation
scheme using the random function in Matlab such that
roughly equal numbers of participants from each site were
assigned to each valence group. Within groups, participants
were pseudo-randomly assigned to complete field or
observer perspective imagery in session 1 and the converse
in session 2 such that perspective order was counterbal-
anced within imagery training group. This was imple-
mented by manually constructing a counterbalancing
scheme prior to testing. Sessions 1 and 2 were completed
mean (SD) 4.02 (3.00) days apart (range 1–14 days).
At the start of session 1, participants completed the
SAS-A (see Figure S1). Then, for each session, participants
gave baseline ratings of current positive and negative mood
[t1 PANAS] and Pleasantness ratings of picture stimuli [t1
Pleasantness]. Participants then completed the standardised
imagery instruction and practice procedure, followed by
the computerised imagery training task in which either
positive or mixed field or observer perspective imagery
was generated depending on group and condition order
assignment. Subsequently, participants repeated the
PANAS [t2 PANAS], completed the music filler task,
completed a final PANAS [t3 PANAS] and Pleasantness
ratings task [t2 Pleasantness], followed by two further
measures of interpretation bias, the SST and CRT (see
Figure S1).
Analysis
Randomisation checks were conducted using independent
samples t tests to identify any differences across groups in
SAS-A. Subsequently, data analysis focused on establish-
ing the effects of positive versus mixed and field versus
observer imagery generation on mood (PANAS) and cog-
nitive bias measures (Pleasantness, SST, CRT) using
ANOVA. SAS-A was included as a covariate in analyses of
SST and CRT data to control for variance due to pre-ex-
isting social anxiety on these two measures which were
administered at one time-point (post-training) only.
ANOVA was conducted on vividness ratings elicited
during the imagery generation task to identify any differ-
ences between valence and perspective conditions that
might contribute to interpreting observed effects. The
analogous analysis could not be conducted for perspective
ratings as an error in the task code meant perspective rat-
ings were not saved for the observer condition. The fol-
lowing data were missing due to interruption of the testing
session or equipment failure: 12 PANAS measurements, 6
Pleasantness ratings, 3 SST negativity scores, 15 CRT bias
scores and 11 vividness scores (see Table 2). One data
point was missing for participant exact age.
Results
Randomisation Checks
Comparisons of characteristics of participants assigned to
each imagery valence group revealed no significant dif-
ferences at the start of session 1 in SAS-A [t(58) = 1.02,
p = .312].
Positive Affect Following Imagery Training
Residualised PANAS positive mood change scores from t1
to t2 were analysed using ANOVA with between-subjects
factor Valence (Positive, Mixed) and within-subjects factor
Perspective (Field, Observer). As predicted, there was a
significant effect of Valence [F(1,57) = 5.66, p = .021,
gp2 = .024; Fig. 1], indicating greater increase in positive
affect in the Positive compared to the Mixed Valence
condition. There was no main effect of Perspective
[F(1,57) = .002, p = .963], and no interaction between
Valence and Perspective [F(1,57) = 1.42, p = .239]. For
PANAS positive raw mood scores at each time-point, see
Table 2.
Negative Affect Following Imagery Training
Residualised PANAS negative mood change scores were
analysed in a similar manner. There was no main effect of
Valence [F(1,57) = .620, p = .434] or Perspective
[F(1,57) = .003, p = .957], and no interaction
[F(1,57) = .007, p = .935].
Pleasantness Ratings of Pictures Following Imagery
Training
Residualised pleasantness rating change scores were anal-
ysed in a similar manner. As predicted, the interaction
between Valence and Perspective was significant
[F(1,54) = 4.70, p = .035, gp2 = .080; see Fig. 2]. There
was no main effect of Valence [F(1,54) = 1.61, p = .210],
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Table 2 Participant characteristics and effects of training
Positive valence imagery group (N = 30) Mixed valence imagery group (N = 30)
Mean SD N Mean SD N
Baseline data
Age 13.8 1.01 29 13.8 1.02 30
SAS-A 46.6 11.0 30 43.5 12.3 30
Mood data
t1 PANAS positive
Field 3.32 .884 29 3.25 .812 30
Observer 3.13 .838 30 3.15 .665 30
t2 PANAS positive
Field 3.45 .880 29 3.18 .938 30
Observer 3.38 .754 30 3.05 .690 30
t3 PANAS positive
Field 3.44 .758 27 3.22 .953 30
Observer 3.38 .873 30 3.19 .920 29
t1 PANAS negative
Field 1.62 .631 29 1.60 .469 30
Observer 1.65 .616 30 1.62 .640 30
t2 PANAS negative
Field 1.59 .637 29 1.63 .556 30
Observer 1.58 .673 30 1.60 .509 30
t3 PANAS negative
Field 1.53 .552 27 1.61 .623 30
Observer 1.46 .638 30 1.59 .589 29
Cognitive bias data (1)
Pleasantness ratings
t1 Pleasantness
Field (total) 5.57 .538 29 5.29 .459 30
Field (familiar) 5.70 .636 29 5.41 .520 30
Field (novel) 5.43 .576 29 5.17 .509 30
Observer (total) 5.69 .514 30 5.24 .660 30
Observer (familiar) 5.90 .517 30 5.33 .684 30
Observer (novel) 5.47 .621 30 5.14 .706 30
t2 Pleasantness
Field (total) 5.80 .653 27 5.32 .582 30
Field (familiar) 6.01 .745 27 5.38 .690 30
Field (novel) 5.57 .689 27 5.26 .608 30
Observer (total) 5.61 .622 28 5.29 .523 30
Observer (familiar) 5.82 .724 28 5.33 .664 30
Observer (novel) 5.39 .613 28 5.26 .517 30
Cognitive bias data (2)
SST negativity
Field .265 .174 28 .374 .212 29
Observer .299 .185 30 .314 .165 30
Cognitive bias data (3)
CRT similarity
Field (Neg targets) 2.45 .460 24 2.42 .344 25
Field (Pos targets) 2.35 .430 24 2.50 .460 25
Field (Neg foils) 2.60 .351 24 2.61 .376 25
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Perspective [F(1,54) = .102, p = .750] or Novelty
[F(1,54) = .018, p = .895].
Paired samples t tests comparing total Pleasantness
scores collapsed across Familiar and Novel stimuli con-
firmed a greater increase in pleasantness ratings in the
Positive compared to the Mixed Valence condition for
Field [t(26) = 2.86, p = .008, d = 1.12] but not Observer
[t(29) = .371, p = .713]. Interactions between Valence
and Novelty, Perspective and Novelty, and between
Valence, Perspective and Novelty were non-significant
[F(1,54) = 3.44, p = .069; F(1,54) = .003, p = .959;
F(1,54) = .138, p = .711].
Table 2 continued
Positive valence imagery group (N = 30) Mixed valence imagery group (N = 30)
Mean SD N Mean SD N
Field (Pos foils) 2.60 .346 24 2.47 .373 25
Observer (Neg targets) 2.39 .437 27 2.41 .362 29
Observer (Pos targets) 2.56 .383 27 2.49 .397 29
Observer (Neg foils) 2.61 .396 27 2.52 .356 29
Observer (Pos foils) 2.44 .407 27 2.58 .364 29
Vividness of imagery during imagery generation task
Field 3.69 .451 23 3.57 .471 29
Observer 3.71 .548 28 3.48 .565 29
t1 PANAS and t1 Pleasantness data were collected prior to imagery training. t2 PANAS data were collected immediately after imagery training.
t3 PANAS and t2 Pleasantness data were collected following completion of the music filler task. See ‘‘Method’’ section for detailed protocol
SAS-A social anxiety scale for adolescents, PANAS positive and negative affect schedule, SST scrambled sentences task, CRT computerised
recognition test
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Fig. 1 Greater increase in positive mood following positive than
mixed imagery. Graph shows estimated marginal means for the main
effect of imagery valence on residualised change in PANAS positive
mood scores pre to post-imagery (t1 to t2). Error bars represent ±1
standard error of the mean. See Table 2 for raw descriptives
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Observer
Fig. 2 Greater increase in pleasantness ratings following positive
than mixed imagery generated from a field but not observer
perspective. Graph shows estimated marginal means for the interac-
tion between imagery valence and perspective on residualised change
in pleasantness ratings of picture stimuli pre to post-imagery (t1 to
t2). Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean. See Table 2
for raw descriptives
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Mood After the Filler Task
To check whether mood was comparable across valence
groups and perspective conditions prior to administration
of cognitive bias measures, t3 PANAS positive and t3
PANAS negative scores were analysed in two separate
ANOVAs with between-subjects factor Valence and
within-subjects factor Perspective. There were no signifi-
cant effects in either analysis [t3 PANAS positive:
Valence: F(1,54) = .446, p = .507; Perspective: F(1,54) =
1.54, p = .220; Valence 9 Perspective: F(1,54) = .025,
p = .876; t3 PANAS negative: Valence: F(1,54) = .523,
p = .472; Perspective: F(1,54) = 1.31, p = .258; Valence 9
Perspective: F(1,54) = .593, p = .445], indicating that
Valence groups and Perspective conditions were compa-
rable on mood prior to administration of cognitive bias
measures.
Scrambled Sentences Negativity Following Imagery
Training
SST negativity scores were analysed in an ANCOVA with
between-subjects factor Valence, within-subjects factor
Perspective and covariate SAS-A total score. We found
the predicted main effect of Valence [F(1,55) = 2.83,
p1-tailed = .049, gp
2 = .049] and predicted interaction
between Valence and Perspective [F(1,55) = 2.95,
p1-tailed = .046, gp
2 = .051].1 Post hoc t tests comparing
SST negativity across Valence groups for each of the two
Perspective conditions showed greater negativity scores in
Mixed compared to Positive Valence condition for Field
[t(56) = 2.12, p = .038, d = .558] but not Observer
[t(58) = .326, p = .746] (Fig. 3). There was no main
effect of Perspective [F(1,55) = .772, p = .383] or SAS-A
total score [F(1,55) = 2.65, p = .110] and no interaction
between Perspective and SAS-A total score
[F(1,55) = 1.03, p = .314].
Computerised Recognition Task Bias Score
Following Imagery Training
Rated similarity for negative and positive targets and foils
on the CRT were analysed using ANCOVA with between-
subjects factor Valence, within-subjects factors Perspec-
tive, recognition statement valence and recognition state-
ment type, and covariate SAS-A total score. There were no
significant effects (all p[ .1; see Table 2).
Vividness of Mental Imagery Across Valence
and Perspective Conditions
Vividness of mental imagery generated during the imagery
generation task was analysed using ANOVA with between-
subjects factor Valence and within-subjects factor Per-
spective. This revealed a marginal main effect of Per-
spective (F1,48 = 2.95, p = .092, gp
2 = .058), no effect of
Valence (F1,48 = .040, p = .841) and no interaction
between Valence and Perspective (F1,48 = 1.14, p = .290;
see Table 2).
Discussion
This study was conducted as a first experimental investi-
gation of the impact on mood and interpretation bias in
adolescents of generating emotionally valenced mental
imagery from field and observer perspectives. Participants
assigned to positive imagery training received a mood
boost and gave more positive interpretations of ambiguous
stimuli. Effects of positive imagery training on interpreta-
tions of ambiguous information were greater when partic-
ipants generated imagery from a field than an observer
perspective. Overall, results show an impact of positive
mental imagery generation on mood and cognition (inter-
pretation specifically), and highlight the moderating effects
of imagery perspective.
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Fig. 3 Lower scrambled sentence task negative bias following
positive than mixed imagery generated from a field but not observer
perspective. Graph shows estimated marginal means for the interac-
tion between valence and perspective on scrambled sentence task
negativity score after controlling for total score on the Social Anxiety
Scale for Adolescents. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the
mean. See Table 2 for raw descriptives
1 When SAS-A total score was not included as a covariate, main
effect of Valence was [F(1,56) = 2.31, p1-tailed = .067, gp
2 = .040]
and interaction between Valence and Perspective [F(1,56) = 2.67,
p1-tailed = .054, gp
2 = .045].
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Increase in Positive Mood Following Positive
Imagery Training
Participants in the positive imagery condition showed a
greater increase in positive mood than did participants in
the mixed imagery condition, in line with findings from
previous studies in adults (Holmes et al. 2008b; Pictet et al.
2011). Recently, a number of studies have sought to
modify mood in children and adolescents using cognitive
bias modification for interpretations (CBM-I) procedures.
While the format of the imagery training used in the cur-
rent study is different to that of existing CBM-I protocols,
conceptually they involve similar processes. Both involve
resolving the ambiguity of a stimulus in a particular
direction, which is then reinforced through multiple trials
of repetitive learning of this ‘rule’. In Lothmann et al.
(2011), male (but not female) adolescents aged
13–17 years showed a change in positive mood following a
computerised word fragment completion CBM-I proce-
dure. Another study showed a change in self-reported
anxious mood in 6–11 year olds repeatedly reinforced for
selecting negative or benign interpretations of ambiguous
animal scenarios (Lester et al. 2011). However, child and
adolescent CBM-I studies do not uniformly find effects on
mood (Cristea et al. 2015; Lester et al. 2011). Some studies
have reported effects on mood in particular participant sub-
groups only (Lau et al. 2011), or only following exposure
to a laboratory stressor (Lau et al. 2012). In the current
study, impact on positive affect was small, which may be
due to the use of a healthy rather than clinical sample
whose levels of positive affect may already be high. Fur-
ther studies are needed to understand these effects and to
explore the contribution of mental imagery specifically
(Lau and Pile 2015).
The current study found no differential effects of ima-
gery training valence on negative mood as measured using
fear and sadness items from the PANAS. This result
potentially reflects floor effects in our non-clinical sample,
consistent with previous studies (Rohrbacher et al. 2014).
To evaluate this suggestion, future studies should include
baseline measures of current depression and anxiety
symptoms, and a greater variety of participants.
We found no moderating effects of perspective on
positive mood in the current study, despite predictions of
greater mood change following field than observer per-
spective imagery. As this adolescent imagery training study
is the first of its kind, this finding warrants further inves-
tigation, particularly given that experimental investigations
of the impact of imagery perspective in the adult literature
have also produced mixed findings (e.g. Holmes et al.
2008a, b; Nelis et al. 2013).
Increase in Pleasantness Ratings of Picture Stimuli
Following Positive Imagery Training for Field
But Not Observer Perspective Imagery
Pleasantness ratings of picture stimuli provide a measure of
interpretation bias. As predicted, results indicate greater
increases in pleasantness ratings following positive than
mixed imagery for field perspective imagery. This pattern did
not differ significantly according to whether or not images
had previously been seen in the context of the imagery gen-
eration task, thus indicating generalization of the effect
beyond the trained stimuli. Importantly, greater pleasantness
ratings following positive than mixed field perspective ima-
gery were not simply a function of state mood, which was
equivalent across groups at the assessment. Previous studies
that have used picture-word imagery training procedures in
adults report similar effects of valence on ratings of picture
stimuli (Holmes et al. 2008b; Pictet et al. 2011). Results from
the current study extend these findings, suggesting positive
picture-word imagery training is effective in modifying how
healthy adolescents interpret ambiguous visual scenes after
their mood has returned to baseline. Critically, this effect was
only seen when imagery was generated from a first (not third)
person perspective. This result is broadly consistent with
previous work suggesting the perspective taken in mental
imagery modulates its impact on subsequent processing
(Berntsen and Rubin 2006; Libby and Eibach 2002). The
current result is also consistent with correlational evidence
that spontaneous adoption of an observer perspective is
associated with reduced emotional impact of recalling an
affectively-laden event in male participants aged
11–20 years (White et al. 2015).
Our finding of an effect of imagery perspective on
interpretation bias in the absence of predicted effects on
immediate mood requires following up in further studies.
Notwithstanding these outstanding questions, the current
finding suggests that explicitly instructing adolescent par-
ticipants on how to adopt a field perspective may enhance
the effects of positive imagery training on later positive
cognitive processing.
Fewer Negative Interpretations on a Novel
Scrambled Sentence Task Following Positive
Imagery Training for Field But Not Observer
Perspective Imagery
On a novel SST measure of interpretation bias, participants
showed lower negativity scores following positive than
mixed imagery generated from a field but not an observer
perspective. This pattern of results is consistent with results
from the pleasantness ratings task measure of interpretation
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bias. It is possible that field perspective imagery encour-
ages more self-relevant processing of the positive training
material, and thus has a greater subsequent impact than
observer perspective imagery on processing of other self-
relevant information (such as the sentences in the SST).
Whereas stimuli in the pleasantness rating task were sim-
ilar in format to stimuli used in the imagery training task,
SST stimuli were quite different in format. As such, this
converging result from the SST supports the notion that the
imagery training procedure effects transfer to tasks with a
different format than the initial training.
While several studies in adults have shown the impact of
imagery training on the SST (Blackwell and Holmes 2010;
Holmes et al. 2009; Lang et al. 2012), to our knowledge,
this is the first study to report effects of positive imagery
training on SST negativity in adolescents. Provisionally,
explicit instruction to adolescent participants on how to
adopt a field versus observer perspective may enhance the
effects of imagery training valence on interpretation bias.
However, it should be noted that effect sizes were small.
The SST used in the current study consisted of adoles-
cent-appropriate statements relating to concerns in anxiety
and social anxiety. Studies have shown that negative
interpretation bias is observed in anxious and depressed
populations (Hertel and Mathews 2011; Orchard et al.
2015), and that scores on an SST predict future depression
(Rude et al. 2002, 2003, 2009; Blackwell et al. 2015).
Therefore, an impact of imagery training on this measure
of cognitive bias is promising. In adolescence, concerns
regarding peer evaluation are prominent. In the current
study, a large proportion of the imagery generation stimuli
suggested social situations involving peers, and we devel-
oped the novel adolescent SST with a view to picking up
on differences in cognitive processing that related specifi-
cally to adolescent social concerns. The result we obtained
using this measure highlights our novel SST as a poten-
tially useful tool to investigate negative interpretation bias
in adolescents specifically.
No Effects on Computerised Recognition Task
Measure of Interpretation Bias
Contrary to predictions, we found no effects of imagery
valence or perspective on an adapted version of a com-
puterised recognition task measure of interpretation bias.
This widely used measure has previously been adminis-
tered in several adolescent CBM-I studies using a verbal
scenario-based training paradigm (e.g. Lothmann et al.
2011; Lau et al. 2012; Fu et al. 2013), and has shown
sensitivity to training effects. However, the training in
these studies closely matches the format and content of the
CRT, and thus such verbal scenario-based paradigms may
be better-placed to induce changes on this measure.
Applicability
In the current study, the majority of training scenarios
depicted common everyday situations. Rather than being
homogenously positive, picture stimuli depicted an
ambiguous scene. The participant must then create some-
thing positive from this ambiguity, by combining it with
the positive word caption via mental imagery. When
applied in a clinical context over multiple sessions of
training, in theory the training should lead to an increased
tendency to imagine positive resolutions in the context of
similar ambiguous situations in everyday life.
In a previous imagery training study in adults, partic-
ipants reported experiencing involuntary memories of
positive training stimuli, triggered by real-life situations
that resemble the training stimuli (Blackwell and Holmes
2010). This suggests positive imagery may become
infused into everyday life, although this phenomenon has
not been systematically investigated. Interestingly, some
have argued the possibility that a mixture of positive and
negative resolutions could have benefits and increase
cognitive flexibility (cf. Blackwell et al. 2015), and sim-
ply imagining positive possibilities is unlikely to provide
a panacea.
Within a therapeutic context, positive imagery training
is perhaps best thought of as a potential adjunct to other
approaches (e.g. CBT, cf. Williams et al. 2013, 2015),
rather than a standalone treatment. While imagery seems
useful to enable individuals to envision positive resolutions
of ambiguity, doing so when thinking about negative
events may be less useful—due to the mood-amplifying
effect of imagery in that case (i.e. negative imagery). As
such, the current study focused on the promotion of posi-
tive interpretations via positive mental imagery. Real life,
however, contains a backdrop of ambiguity that is less
homogenous. Suggestions have been proposed for how
mental imagery may be incorporated into everyday life
(Holmes et al. 2016a, b; Pearson et al. 2015), and imagery-
based psychotherapy techniques have been discussed in
detail (Holmes et al. 2007, 2016a, b). Furthermore, there is
evidence that imagery training may be useful in a wider
variety of non-therapeutic contexts too, such as reducing
prejudice (West et al. 2011).
Summary
Results show that generating positive mental imagery
resulted in increases in positive mood and interpretations.
Effects on interpretation bias were not attributable to
affective carryover from the mental imagery training
manipulation (i.e., mood priming), since a filler task
equalised mood prior to administration of measures of
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interpretation bias. The potentially beneficial effects of
positively valenced mental imagery on two measures of
interpretation bias occurred when imagery was generated
from a field (first person) perspective, and did not occur
when mental imagery was generated from an observer
(third person) perspective. These findings highlight the
impact of positive mental imagery generation on mood and
cognition in male adolescents. They also suggest that
explicitly instructing male adolescent participants in how
to adopt a field perspective in mental imagery may enhance
the impact of positive imagery training on interpretation
bias. Future research should extend these findings to female
adolescents and clinical groups, as the current findings are
not generalizable to these populations.
Lifetime mental health problems commonly have their
inception during adolescence. As such, early intervention is
crucial. Understanding the cognitive factors that cause,
maintain, or indeed protect against psychopathology is a
promising avenue for research. Findings from the current
study have implications for understanding cognitive
mechanisms and moderators underlying the relationship
between mental imagery, mood and cognitive processing in
adolescents (Burnett Heyes et al. 2013). Potentially, mental
imagery-based techniques may be valuable as a clinical
treatment strategy in child and adolescent groups, and as a
preventative cognitive ‘‘vaccine’’ to boost resilience in
those at risk of emotional disorders (Holmes et al. 2009).
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